A Tale of Two Proceedings Turnabout Is Fair Play in the Yukos U.S. Bankruptcy Cases

A Tale of Two Proceedings Turnabout Is Fair Play in the Yukos U.S. Bankruptcy Cases

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The continuing drama relating to the demise of Russia's leading oil company, the Yukos Oil Co., has generated two U.S. bankruptcy proceedings that have raised some of the most interesting cross-border insolvency issues in the last year. Both proceedings emanate from the pitched battle between Yukos' management and equity investors on the one hand—who assert that the Russian government is expropriating the company for its own benefit in violation of Russian and international law—and the Russian government and an interim insolvency receiver appointed by a Russian court (the receiver) on the other hand—who assert that Yukos' management caused the company to commit a tax fraud of approximately $27.5 billion that can only be resolved in a Russian court.

Both sides have extended their litigation campaigns to the U.S. bankruptcy courts in an effort to gain strategic leverage. The first American case involved the voluntary chapter 11 petition filed by Yukos' management in an effort to prevent the Russian government's foreclosure sale in Russia of material assets of the company. Ultimately, that case was dismissed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in February 2005 in a decision that found Russia to be the appropriate forum for resolution of the parties' dispute.2 In March 2006, Yukos was placed into Russian bankruptcy proceedings by its banks, and in a classic "turnabout is fair play" tactic, the Russian bankruptcy receiver filed a chapter 15 case in New York to obtain an injunction to prevent Yukos' management from consummating their own material asset sales of the company's indirect interests in a Lithuanian oil refinery company.

Each case was brought by diametrically opposed parties, yet both cases sought to accomplish a similar objective. Both were innovative efforts to use U.S. bankruptcy law as a sword to enjoin non-U.S. transactions involving the sale of significant non-U.S. assets by non-U.S. entities to non-U.S. acquirors. Indeed, the only readily apparent U.S. role in either case was the fact that third parties with material roles in the targeted transactions were subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. bankruptcy courts and therefore would be likely to refrain from taking (or facilitating) actions that would violate U.S. court-ordered injunctions. In essence, the Yukos cases represent a creative anti-takeover litigation strategy through the use of U.S. bankruptcy law.

Both cases have tested the outer limits of U.S. bankruptcy law in the cross-border context. Yukos' chapter 11 case resulted in a significant decision regarding the breadth of U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign enterprises with little or no assets or operations in the United States. And the chapter 15 case is the first major contested cross-border case brought under the newly enacted chapter 15 regime. This article discusses some of the intriguing issues presented by these cases and their implications for future cross-border restructurings.

The Yukos Chapter 11 Case

The tale of the Yukos controversy has been widely reported.3 Yukos had been one of the leading success stories of the Russian economy's conversion to a market-based system, eventually growing to an estimated market capitalization of approximately $40 billion. After a remarkable period of growth, an enormous financial and political scandal erupted when the Russian government alleged that the company had evaded paying $27.5 billion of taxes and arrested and imprisoned Yukos' CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had become a well-known public figure rumored to be interested in challenging the incumbent Russian president in future elections. In response to these developments, members of Yukos' senior management, particularly U.S. citizens such as Bruce K. Misamore who served as its CFO, elected to manage the company's affairs from (what they termed "exile") outside of Russia.

The Russian government sought to satisfy its purported tax claims through a foreclosure auction regarding Yukos' largest asset, its interests in Yugans-kneftegas (YNG). Yukos was not subject to any Russian insolvency proceeding at the time, and Misamore caused the filing of a voluntary chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas on Dec. 14, 2004 (the petition date).4 Through the bankruptcy filing, Yukos sought to invoke U.S. bankruptcy law's automatic stay to enjoin the auction. In addition, Yukos obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the bankruptcy court that enjoined numerous third parties who were subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction from assisting or participating in the auction and foreclosure sale.5 Through these actions, Yukos was able temporarily to stymie the Russian foreclosure process because of the unwillingness of the banks who were intending to finance the acquirer to follow through on the financing in violation of the TRO and automatic stay. Ultimately, however, as discussed below, some of these third parties convinced the bankruptcy court to dismiss Yukos' chapter 11 case and the Russian government sold YNG to Rosneft, a Russian oil company.

Based on its balance sheet, Yukos presented one of the largest bankruptcy cases ever filed in the United States.6 Yukos was incorporated under Russian law and virtually all of Yukos' assets, operations and 100,000 employees were located in Russia. Moreover, the Texas bankruptcy court found that Yukos' most significant assets (oil and gas deposits) were "literally a part of the Russian land" and its operations formed a "central part" of the Russian economy.7

In contrast, Yukos' presence in the United States was exceedingly limited and was the result of two circumstances that occurred within the 10-day period prior to the petition date. First, Yukos' CFO began conducting his activities as CFO from his home in Houston on Dec. 4, 2004.8 Second, certain funds were transferred to the United States purportedly for Yukos' benefit. These funds included $480,000 that were transferred to Yukos' U.S. counsel as a retainer for legal services on Dec. 10, 2004, and were transferred subsequently to the account of Yukos USA Inc., a Texas corporation that was incorporated as a Yukos subsidiary mere hours before the bankruptcy filing.9 Certain other funds were transferred to the United States purportedly for Yukos' benefit after the petition date (pursuant to documents that had been "back-dated" to make it appear that such transfers had occurred on the petition date), which Yukos acknowledged had been done to "create a better case for jurisdiction" based on "property" in the United States.10

The Texas bankruptcy court observed that Yukos had filed its chapter 11 proceeding, among other things, to halt and challenge the Russian government's tax enforcement actions and to seek redress against the Russian government and other entities. Yukos had also contested its Russian tax liability in other forums, including Russian courts and the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, Yukos filed a demand for arbitration of its tax dispute with the Russian government shortly before filing its chapter 11 petition.

The primary challenge to Yukos' chapter 11 was prosecuted by Deutsche Bank AG (DB), a prominent bank that had been involved in the potential YNG auction until it was enjoined by the chapter 11 TRO due to its ties to the United States. DB sought dismissal of the case based on numerous grounds, including: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) abstention under §1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, (3) forum non conveniens, (4) international comity and (5) the act of state doctrine.

The bankruptcy court first had to determine the threshold issue of whether it had jurisdiction pursuant to §109 of the Code. Section 109 provides extremely broad bankruptcy jurisdiction over any entity that "resides or has a domicile, a place of business or property in the United States."11 Yukos claimed jurisdiction existed because (a) it had "property" in the United States based on the funds that had been transferred shortly before the petition date and (b) Misamore's home office was a "place of business" in the United States. The court determined that the $480,000 that was in the account of Yukos USA Inc. (an affiliated nondebtor in the case) on the petition date was being held "for Yukos' benefit" and therefore constituted "property" of Yukos in the United States for jurisdictional purposes.12 The court then declined to consider, as unnecessary, whether Yukos had a "place of business" in the United States.13

While the bankruptcy court (in the context of its §1112 analysis discussed below) determined that the $480,000 had been transferred to the United States for the purpose of creating bankruptcy jurisdiction, the court appears to have rejected the argument that this property could not serve as a basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction because it was moved to the United States to "manufacture" jurisdiction for improper forum-shopping purposes. This aspect of the court's ruling is significant because it contradicts prior jurisprudence that indicated that property transferred to the United States to manufacture jurisdiction should not be considered in determining whether bankruptcy jurisdiction exists.14 As a result, this ruling represents perhaps the most expansive decision yet regarding the jurisdictional reach of the Code.

Despite its jurisdictional finding, the bankruptcy court ultimately declined to exercise such jurisdiction over Yukos and instead dismissed the chapter 11 case pursuant to §1112(b) of the Code.15 Section 1112(b) provides courts with the discretionary authority to dismiss chapter 11 proceedings "for cause" where, among other things, such dismissal serves "the best interest of creditors and the estate."16 Citing the "totality of the circumstances," the court determined to dismiss the case because (1) the sheer size of Yukos' operations and its importance to the Russian economy favor permitting resolution of the disputes presented by Yukos in a forum where the Russian government will participate; (2) Yukos' proposed plan of reorganization was not, in essence, a financial reorganization but rather a challenge to the actions of the Russian government and a forum to litigate other causes of action that Yukos believes it holds; (3) Yukos had commenced proceedings in several other forums and sought to replace such forums (and otherwise applicable foreign and international law) with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (which is not uniquely qualified to determine Yukos' various disputes) and U.S. law; (4) the court's personal jurisdiction over many pertinent parties to Yukos' disputes was questionable; (5) the vast majority of Yukos' business operations were in Russia; (6) any reorganization of Yukos would require the cooperation of the Russian government; and (7) the "property" to support jurisdiction was transferred to the United States for the purpose of creating jurisdiction less than one week before the petition date.17

In essence, the court deferred to Russian courts as the more appropriate, practical and effective forum for resolution of Yukos' dispute and its financial crisis. Notably, the court's ruling rejected the arguments that the case should be dismissed based upon the independent doctrines of (a) an act of state, (b) forum non conveniens and (c) international comity.18 However, the essential substance of each of these theories is clearly inextricably interwoven in the court's "totality of the circumstances" analysis under §1112(b). At bottom, the Yukos ruling flatly rejected the company's forum shopping as a litigation tactic to prevent a takeover of its YNG business through the Russian government's foreclosure proceeding. The case also is a clear example of the practical limitation to the use of chapter 11 to restructure foreign enterprises in highly contested cases, which stands in contrast to other cases where foreign enterprises have successfully invoked chapter 11 jurisdiction where there was critical creditor support for such a restructuring.19 It will serve as a significant consideration for any foreign enterprise that seeks to restructure exclusively under chapter 11 where there is any significant resistance, particular resistance by the sovereign power of such enterprise's home country.

The Yukos Chapter 15 Case

After dismissal of the chapter 11 case, an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding was commenced against Yukos in the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow, Russia, in which the court appointed Eduard K. Rebgun as the interim receiver of the company under Russian law.20 Shortly thereafter a new dispute erupted between the receiver and Yukos' management regarding management's efforts to sell the company's indirect 57.3 percent interest in Lithuanian AB Mazeikiu Nafta (Nafta), one of Yukos' most valuable investments, valued at as much as U.S. $1.4 billion. According to the receiver, under Russian law and orders of the Arbitrazh court, Yukos and its management were prohibited from selling such a material asset without the receiver's consent. Moreover, the receiver alleged that management had strategically transferred Yukos' interests in Nafta to a Dutch entity outside of Russia and that management intended to use the sale proceeds to discriminatorily and preferentially satisfy the claims of Yukos creditors who management determined to be "true creditors" (i.e., creditors other than the Russian government). In other words, the receiver alleged that management sought to evade the Russian bankruptcy proceeding and his authority and duty under Russian law.

On April 13, 2006, the receiver commenced a chapter 15 case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to, among other things, prohibit Yukos and its management and affiliates from consummating any sale of the Nafta interests without the receiver's consent.21 Like the YNG sale, the Nafta transaction contemplated a sale of interests in a non-U.S. business between non-U.S. parties that was to occur outside of the United States. However, because key members of Yukos' management were U.S. citizens (or were subject to the U.S. bankruptcy court's jurisdiction), the injunction strategically sought to block the transaction by preventing such third parties from taking action to facilitate the Nafta transaction.

The bankruptcy court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting the sale, which was quickly opposed by Yukos' management, which claimed that the injunction was facilitating an illegal expropriation and dismemberment of Yukos by the Russian government through its agents (which included, according to Yukos' management, the Russian receiver). Battle had been joined once again, though in a different U.S. bankruptcy court.

The chapter 15 interim injunction and court proceedings provided a forum in which the receiver and Yukos' management were forced to negotiate regarding the Nafta sale. While the receiver was not ultimately opposed to a sale of Nafta at an adequate price, the receiver alleged that it could not determine whether an adequate price and a fair sales process had occurred because Yukos' management had not shared information regarding the sale with him. In addition, the receiver was concerned that any sale proceeds not be used to pay creditors in an improperly discriminatory or preferential manner. Through the chapter 15 proceeding, the receiver was able to pressure Yukos' management to provide such information to him. In addition, the receiver obtained an opportunity to analyze this information regarding the transaction because the chapter 15 injunction effectively blocked Yukos' management from consummating a sale without U.S. bankruptcy court permission.22

Based on the information that he received through the chapter 15 case, the receiver ultimately concluded that the sale price and process was fair, but he nonetheless requested the bankruptcy court to maintain the interim injunction prohibiting consummation of the Nafta sale because the receiver believed that there were unreasonable risks regarding the purchaser's ability to consummate the sale.23 While the bankruptcy court acknowledged the legitimacy of many of the receiver's concerns, it ultimately concluded that the risk of causing the Nafta sale to fall apart by continuing the interim injunction outweighed the risks identified by the receiver. Looming large in the court's analysis was the fact that the purchaser had conditioned its offer to purchase upon execution of a sale agreement on or before May 26, 2006, and the fact that the Lithuanian government, which was the other major shareholder of Nafta, supported the transaction.24 Accordingly, on May 26, 2006, the bankruptcy court permitted the interim injunction to expire.25

However, that was not the end of the chapter 15 case. In addition to discussing (through private negotiations and hearings with the court) the adequacy of the sale process, the chapter 15 case also provided a forum to address the receiver's concern regarding the distribution of the approximately $1.5 billion of sale proceeds from the Nafta sale. As noted above, the receiver sought to ensure that such proceeds would not be applied preferentially and would be, at least in part, available to satisfy the claims of Yukos' creditors in the Russian insolvency proceeding. Ultimately, the parties agreed upon a consensual order that was entered by the bankruptcy court to resolve these issues on May 26, 2006 (the "consensual order").26 The consensual order set forth a specific process through which the proceeds would be placed into an escrow/trust account and distributed according to a Dutch court-supervised process for resolution of claims against the proceeds. Among other things, the consensual order directed Yukos' management and relevant affiliates to take corporate actions necessary to (a) have the proceeds deposited with the bailiff of the Dutch court or in a segregated interest-bearing account if the bailiff could not receive the proceeds, (b) seek the release of all encumbrances against the Nafta interests and their proceeds, (c) request the Dutch court to establish a claims reconciliation process to provide a reasonable opportunity for parties with claims against the proceeds to assert their claims and for other parties-in-interest to object to such claims, if appropriate and (d) request the Dutch court to grant the Russian receiver standing before the Dutch court to assert the claims of creditors that were subject to the Russian insolvency proceeding. The consensual order also served as a respectful request from the New York bankruptcy court to the Dutch court to implement the forgoing process as a matter of international comity.

In addition, the consensual order imposed significant reporting and disclosure duties upon Yukos and its management to provide the receiver with prior notice and adequate information regarding any future material asset sales (or similar transactions) of any Yukos entity outside the ordinary course of business. The consensual order also required the receiver to (a) include a copy of Yukos management's proposed reorganization plan for Yukos in the receiver's report to creditors in the Russian insolvency proceeding and (b) take reasonable steps to facilitate Yukos management's attendance at the meeting of creditors to be held in connection with the Russian insolvency proceeding.

At bottom, the receiver successfully used chapter 15 as a litigation strategy to block a change-of-control transaction until he had gained sufficient information to become comfortable with the economic and procedural fairness of the Nafta transaction. In addition, the receiver was able to gain significant informational rights going forward through the continuing notice and disclosure duties that the consensual order imposed on Yukos' management outside of Russia. Furthermore, the consensual order and the continuing pendency of the chapter 15 case also provide a readily accessible judicial forum for the receiver to litigate any dispute that it may have regarding future asset sales or other issues. Indeed, the bankruptcy court exhibited its willingness to entertain such claims by the receiver by entering the initial injunction that blocked the Nafta transaction for six weeks based on the receiver's assertion that the sale might be improper. So understood, the chapter 15 case stands in sharp contrast to Yukos' failed attempt to invoke chapter 11 powers to halt the YNG transaction, which resulted in prompt dismissal of that proceeding.

Notably, all of the relief in the Yukos chapter 15 case was granted without the court ever actually granting "recognition" to the Russian insolvency proceeding under §1517 of the Code. Instead, the interim relief and the consensual order were entered based on the court's power to grant interim/temporary relief under §1519.27 The use of §1519 to, in effect, provide comprehensive expedited relief in the Yukos case demonstrates the breadth and flexibility of the relief available under new chapter 15.

While the Yukos cases differ in their results, they bear some striking similarities. The courts in both U.S. bankruptcy cases deferred, as a matter of international comity, to the insolvency and judicial procedures of other nations regarding the Yukos dispute. The initial chapter 11 case was dismissed in deference to the judicial insolvency procedures available in Russia. Similarly, the chapter 15 case provided substantial relief to aid the Russian insolvency proceeding that followed dismissal of the chapter 11 case. In addition, the chapter 15 case substantially deferred to (and requested reciprocal aid from) the Dutch judicial proceedings that were pending regarding the Nafta sale and the use of such sale proceeds.

Furthermore, both cases sought to harness the power of U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction to halt otherwise non-U.S. transactions between non-U.S. parties by targeting peripheral parties to the transactions who were subject to U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction and therefore could be deterred from facilitating the transactions. In the chapter 11 case, Yukos attempted to implement this technique by targeting Deutsche Bank and other important third parties involved in the YNG auction. In the chapter 15 case, the Russian receiver successfully targeted Yukos' key managers who were precluded from taking necessary corporate actions to consummate a Nafta transaction because of the chapter 15 injunction. This innovative use of the new expansive powers under chapter 15 may likely serve as a model for other contested distressed transactions in the future.

While Yukos' chapter 15 case has clearly not come to an end, as discussed above, the initial battle has served as an instructive example for cross-border insolvency practitioners seeking to navigate the uncharted territory of new chapter 15.



1 The author thanks and acknowledges his colleague Evan Flaschen for his consultation and support regarding this article.

2 See In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).

3 For the bankruptcy court's description of the circumstances relating to the Yukos dispute and its chapter 11 filing, see In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 399-406.

4 In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 399.

5 Yukos also sought to use the U.S. bankruptcy court to obtain a series of orders to advance its efforts to challenge the Russian government's tax assessments, including motions requesting orders (a) authorizing it to serve the Russian government with process in the bankruptcy case, (b) compelling Russia to arbitrate the tax dispute with Yukos and (c) declaring that U.S. law applies to Yukos' property located in foreign nations. In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 403. In addition, Yukos filed a proposed chapter 11 reorganization plan, the primary features of which were equitable subordination of all of the Russian government's tax claims and a litigation trust to pursue claims that Yukos believed it possessed against the Russian government. Id.

6 See id. at 399 (noting that Yukos' chapter 11 proceeding appeared to be the "largest bankruptcy ever filed in the United States").

7 Id.

8 See id. at 402.

9 See id.

10 In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 403.

11 11 U.S.C. §109. Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the eligibility requirements to be a "debtor" under chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). The place of business need not be the debtor's main place of business. See In re Spanish Cay Co. Ltd., 161 B.R. 715, 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that debtor had place of business even though debtor did not file tax returns, did not register to do business in Florida, and did not register for appropriate business license). Various types of property in the United States have been found sufficient to support chapter 11 jurisdiction. See Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A. v. World of English N.V., 23 B.R. 1015, 1019-23 (D.C. Ga. 1982) (bank account); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Comm. Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1988), aff'd., 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (bank account); In re Paper I Partners LP, 283 B.R. 661, 672-74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (business records); In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 37-38 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (unearned portion of U.S. counsel's retainer, bank account and business records); Spanish Cay, 161 B.R. at 721-22 (bank account, equipment and advertising materials); In re World of English, 16 B.R. 817, 819 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (accounts receivable owed by U.S. party to foreign enterprise). Courts do not require that such property or place of business be substantial, but rather will find chapter 11 available based on even a small U.S. bank account. See Global Ocean Carriers, 251 B.R. at 38 ("we conclude that the bank accounts constitute property in the United States for purposes of eligibility under §109 of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of how much money was actually in them on the petition date"); In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) ($194 in a bank account qualifies the debtor under §109 to file chapter 7 case).

12 In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 406-07.

13 See id.

14 See In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 652 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("to make the record clear, if these debtors were to continue to assert eligibility by virtue of having acquired U.S. mailing addresses and opening small bank accounts in the U.S., then this court would directly hold that one cannot so manufacture eligibility..."); Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A. v. World of English, N.V., 23 B.R. 1015, 1022 (D.C. Ga. 1982) (debtors satisfied "property" element of §109, "there being no evidence that the bank account was transferred from Japan to California merely to create jurisdiction for a future bankruptcy proceeding involving debtors..."); cf. In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("if property has been specifically placed or left in the United States for the sole purpose of creating eligibility that would not otherwise exist, then dismissal might be appropriate...").

15 See In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 410-11.

16 11 U.S.C. §1112. The Yukos decision was rendered before the 2005 amendments to the Code became effective on Oct. 17, 2005. Those amendments substantially altered §1112(b) to, among other things, expand the grounds for §1112(b) relief and mandate expedited judicial resolution of §1112 motions to dismiss or convert a chapter 11 case.

17 See In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 410-11.

18 See id. at 407-410.

19 See, e.g., In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. Avianca (In re Avianca), 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying motion to dismiss voluntary chapter 11 proceeding commenced by Colombian airline with support of key creditor consituencies); In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 37 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss voluntary chapter 11 proceeding regarding Greek shipping company with support of key creditor consituencies); In re Edelnor S.A., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 02-14530 (ALG) (pre-packaged chapter 11 proceeding of Chilean power company overwhelmingly supported by bondholders impaired by plan); In re Chivor S.A. E.S.P., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 02-13291 (BRL) (pre-packaged chapter 11 proceeding of Colombian power company overwhelmingly supported by bank debt-holders impaired by plan).

20 As of the time of writing this article, no published decision had been issued in the Yukos chapter 15 case. Accordingly, the factual background regarding the Yukos chapter 15 case is derived from the orders, transcripts and pleadings filed in the chapter 15 case, which can be found on the electronic docket of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York at https://ecf.nysb.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl. In addition, some docket items can be obtained from www.chapter15.com.

21 See In re Yukos Oil Co., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD), Docket No. 1 (chapter 15 petition).

22 The initial temporary restraining order entered on April 13, 2006, broadly enjoined Yukos and its management and others from even negotiating a sale of the Nafta interests. See In re Yukos Oil Co., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD) Docket No. 9 (Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraining Order dated April 13, 2006 at p.3-4). Subsequent bridge orders entered by the bankruptcy court permitted negotiation but prohibited Yukos and its management from actually entering into any agreement regarding such a transaction. See id. Docket No. 37 (Bridge Order dated April 21, 2006); id. Docket No. 46 (Second Bridge Order dated April 26, 2006); id. Docket No. 51 (Third Bridge Order dated April 28, 2006); id. Docket No. 58 (Fourth Bridge Order dated May 4, 2006); id. Docket No. 73 (Fifth Bridge Order dated May 19, 2006).

23 See id. Docket No. 83 (Transcript of May 26, 2006 Hearing, at p. 8-14).

24 See id. Docket No. 83 (Transcript of May 26, 2006 Hearing, at p. 8-14).

25 See id. (Transcript of May 26, 2006 Hearing, at p. 19).

26 See id. Docket No. 83 (Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD)) (consensual order).

27 See 11 U.S.C. §1519. All of the interim orders and the consensual order cite only §1519 as the basis for the relief granted therein. See In re Yukos Oil Co., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD) Docket No. 83 (consensual order, p. 1); id. Docket No. 83 (May 26th Transcript at p. 5) (noting that context of relief sought was a motion under §1519 and that "recognition has not been sought or granted"); id. Docket No. 9 (Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraining Order dated April 13, 2006 at p.1) (citing only 11 U.S.C. §1519 as statutory basis for relief); id. Docket No. 37 (Bridge Order dated April 21, 2006); id. Docket No. 46 (Second Bridge Order dated April 26, 2006); id. Docket No. 51 (Third Bridge Order dated April 28, 2006); id. Docket No. 58 (Fourth Bridge Order dated May 4, 2006); id. Docket No. 73 (Fifth Bridge Order dated May 19, 2006).

Journal Date: 
Saturday, July 1, 2006