The intriguing question raised by Mark Weidemaier’s superb new paper posted a few weeks ago (here) was whether, if a Euro area country hits a debt crisis, it would be mandatory for it to use the Euro CACs that are now part of the majority of Euro area sovereign bonds. Mark’s paper says no (for more, see also Tyler Zellinger, here; and Buchta, Shan, Plambeck & Shufro, here).
About ten days ago, this question came up at a conference at the EUI organized by Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. The plan for the conference hadn’t been to discuss this particular topic, but CACs and restructurings in the Euro area more broadly. But Mark’s paper had just come out and it turned out that almost everyone there had strong views about it; particularly in the context of thinking about Italian sovereign debt.
The panel of CAC/sovereign debt experts was: Yannis Manuelidis, Anna Gelpern, Aitor Erce and Giampaolo Galli. And the discussion – helped by interventions from experts in the audience who included Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Ignacio Tirado and Elena Carletti -- was fascinating. Bottom line: While experts have strong views about this topic and there is zero clarity. Mark’s view is that the existing Euro CACs are but an option; and he makes a strong argument for that position (one that I buy). Ignacio, however, is equally convinced of the opposite position; that the Euro area countries are stuck using the CACs if they hit a debt crisis and need to restructure (this does not mean that he thinks this is the efficient solution; just the legal mandated one). And I have learned over the years that Ignacio is a very careful thinker and knows his European treaty law better than almost anyone. Yannis, for his part, was – as he always is – nuanced and took a position somewhere in between. Put differently, he refused to say whether he agreed with Mark or Igancio. Anna too, didn’t take a side on this (although she knows the history of what was originally intended by the policy makers better than anyone). Perhaps most interesting – especially since I had not heard his views before – was the wonderfully gracious and wise Giampaolo Galli (Economics Dept, Cattolica University, Roma), who talked explicitly and in detail about the debt situation in Italy. For those who don't know him yet, here is his Wikipedia page (it is an understatement to say that he has had an impressive career).
My reason for putting up this post is that Giampaolo has just posted his conference draft, “Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Frameworks: Why and When is Restructuring Appropriate” to ssrn.com (here). The draft both addresses the question raised by Mark in a nuanced way (while also reporting the views of those in the legal department of the Italian Treasury) and goes further to ask whether the primary task of the Italian government now should be thinking of restructuring techniques or figuring out ways to improve growth and get spending under control. Giampaolo argues persuasively that focus should be on the latter problems and not the former. Clever restructuring techniques, he explains, may eventually be needed. But they are not the solution to the problem with the giant Italian debt.
Given the strong disagreements on this matter, and the utter lack of clarity as to what was intended by Euro area policy makers in the first place, it sure would be helpful to have some kind of legislative history as to what was intended when the Euro CACs were adopted in late 2012. Alternatively, maybe the European authorities could tell us what they were thinking? Or what they are thinking now about what they should have been thinking then?