By: Heather Hili
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in In re XMH Corp.,[1] the Seventh Circuit added trademark licenses to the types of intellectual property that cannot be assigned in bankruptcy without the licensor’s permission.[2] In 2009, XMH Corporation (“XMH”) and some of its subsidiaries sought relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”).[3] Blue, a debtor subsidiary of XMH, attempted to sell its assets to purchasers, Emerisque Brands and SKNL, including a trademark license agreement with Western Glove Works (“Western”).[4] The bankruptcy court refused to allow Blue to assign its trademark license agreement to the purchasers because Western would not consent to the assignment, and trademark law prohibits the non-consensual assignment of a trademark.[5]
By: Jonathan Abramovitz
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in In re Two Gales, Inc.,[1] the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (the “Panel”) held that 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) is not intended to serve as a basis for denying a claim for attorney’s fees, but rather serves as a priority scheme for dealing with distributions on allowed claims.[2] The law firm of Cupps & Garrison, LLC (“C & G”) represented Two Gales, Inc. (the “Debtor”) as its bankruptcy counsel before the case was converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7.[3] The bankruptcy court ordered C & G to disgorge its $10,000 retainer because the Debtor was administratively insolvent and, under section 726(b), chapter 7 administrative expenses are entitled to priority in proceedings converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7 where the debtor is administratively insolvent.[4] The Panel reversed, holding that before ordering disgorgement of C & G’s retainer, the lower court should have determined whether C & G had a properly perfected lien on its prepetition retainer under state law.[5]
By: Linda C. Attreed
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Adopting a narrow view of the section 362(b)(4)[1] “police and regulatory power” exception to the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas, in In re Reyes,[2] held that Josie Jones (“Jones”) and her attorney Robert Wilson (“Wilson”) violated the automatic stay provision by reporting the debtors to the Texas Real Estate Commission (“the TREC”).[3] The court determined that Jones and Wilson had intentionally prosecuted the TREC complaint “to punish the debtor for filing, and to exert pressure on the debtor in order to collect on the judgment.”[4] The court noted that Jones and Wilson filed the TREC action against the debtors approximately two months after seeking to lift the stay, and held that this was sufficient to support a finding of civil contempt.[5]
By: Gregory R. Bruno
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard),[1] the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that college tuition payments could be recovered as constructively fraudulent transfers because the debtors did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” for pre-petition payments made to Marquette University (“Marquette”) on their adult son’s behalf. In 2008, the debtors paid Marquette $21,527 to cover the rest of their son’s tuition and related expenses.[2] The chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid and recover these payments as fraudulent transfers.[3] Marquette moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the debtors received reasonably equivalent value for these payments because the debtors received two benefits from such payments: (1) peace of mind in knowing that their son was receiving a quality education, and (2) the expectation that their son would become financially independent from them because of such education.[4]
By: Eric J. Dostal
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in J.J. Re–Bar Corp. v. United States (In re J.J. Re–Bar Corp.)[1] the Ninth Circuit held that the Anti–Injunction Act[2] does not bar the post-confirmation collection of a trust fund recovery penalty (“TFRP”)[3] from the responsible officers of a debtor corporation by the IRS.[4] The Ninth Circuit, relying on Davis v. United States[5] determined that because TFRP liability arises from officers’ willful conduct, such penalties are the obligations of the officers themselves and not the debtor corporation.[6] This case arose after the IRS assessed a TFRP against the Skokans, the corporate officers responsible for the company’s failure to remit certain “trust fund taxes–the tax withholdings from employee paychecks–to the government.”[7] The IRS chose to assess the TFRP against the responsible officers of the debtor after the debtor had confirmed its plan and paid its outstanding payroll taxes.[8] Seeking to halt the IRS’ collection efforts, J.J. Re–Bar “filed a motion to enforce . . . the Plan and to hold the IRS in contempt.”[9] Both the Bankruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ruled for the IRS.[10]
Jennifer K. Arcarola
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In In re Balas & Morales,[1] the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California held that a legally married same-sex couple could jointly petition for bankruptcy.[2] The debtors, Gene Balas and Carlos Morales, are a same-sex couple legally married in California who jointly filed for bankruptcy under chapter 13.[3] The United States Trustee (the “Trustee”) moved to dismiss the case, alleging that section 1307(c) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) prohibits two males from jointly filing for bankruptcy[4] because the Defense of Marriage Act (the “DOMA”) defines “spouse” as a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife,[5] and so Trustee alleged that their case should be dismissed “for cause” pursuant to section 1307(c) of the Code.[6] The court concluded that (1) the DOMA was unconstitutional as applied to a same-sex married couple under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (2) no legitimate government interest was served in applying the statute, and (3) none of the eleven grounds for dismissal listed in section 1307 were implicated.[7]
By: Ravi Vohra
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In Motors Liquidation Co.,[1] the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied class certification and disallowed two claims set forth by the Botha and Balintulo claimants (the “Class Claimants”) in General Motors Corporation’s (“Old GM”) chapter 11 proceedings.[2] The claims were first raised prepetition by 26 named plaintiffs in two separate groups, (the “Botha Plaintiffs” and the “Balintulo Plaintiffs”), and Old GM filed its chapter 11 petition while those lawsuits were still pending. The Botha and Balintulo Plaintiffs then filed proofs of claims against the corporation.[3] More than twelve months after Old GM’s chapter 11 filing and eight months after the bar date, the Class Claimants moved for class treatment and Old GM then sought to disallow the class claims.[4] Among other things, the Class Claimants alleged that they were victims of the infamous system of apartheid in South Africa, and that Old GM aided and abetted the perpetrators of the apartheid system in causing the claimants’ injuries.[5]
By: Megan Quail
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in Myers v. Toojay’s Management Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a private business, Toojay’s, which refused to hire Myers, an individual, based on his prior bankruptcy filing.[1] Myers claimed that Toojay’s violated section 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) by declining to offer him employment after learning of his previously filed bankruptcy petition.[2] The court held that section 525(b) of the Code does not prohibit a private employer from declining to hire a person because of a prior bankruptcy despite prohibiting public employers from taking similar action.[3] As the third United States Court of Appeals ruling of its kind, Myers v. Toojay’s Management Corp. continues the trend of protecting the discriminatory hiring decisions of private employers.[4]
By: David N. Saponara
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
By: Edmund Witter
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Recently, in Old West Annuity and Life Ins. Co. v. Apollo Group,[1] the Eleventh Circuit held state law determined whether a court could pierce the corporate veil under an alter ego theory even though a federal tax lien was at issue.[2] In reaching its holding, the Eleventh Circuit had to decide whether the need for a uniform federal rule justified applying the federal common law standard for determining alter ego liability or if state law applied by virtue of a state’s right to define property interests of its taxpayers.[3]