On May 21, 2015, as amended on Aug. 18, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision approving the settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case through a structured dismissal.[1] The court approved the use of a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 bankruptcy where the dismissal calls for a distribution that does not specifically adhere to the priority scheme in Bankruptcy Code § 507.
Committees Committee
Committees
Make-whole premiums are a fixture of commercial loan agreements. Their purpose is to determine the parties’ respective rights in the event that prepayment becomes economically efficient for a borrower.
On June 15, 2015, in Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC,[1] the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit bankruptcy courts to award attorney fees under § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to counsel or other professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate for work performed in defending a fee application, potentially giving unsecured
While the Bankruptcy Code provides for payment of the fees and expenses of an official creditors’ committee’s court-approved professionals[1] and for reimbursement of the expenses (although not the professional fees) incurred by a member of an official creditors’ committee incurred in performing committee duties,[2] it permits an unsecured creditor to seek reimbursement of “actual, necessary expenses,” plus “reasonable compensation for professional services” only where the creditor has made a “substantial contribution” in the chapter 11 case.[3]
You have probably given the preference defense speech countless times to unsecured trade creditor clients that 90-day payments are likely preferences, but may be covered by one of the typical § 547(c) defenses: subsequent provision of new value, ordinary course of business and contemporaneous exchange for new value. The standard defenses are so prevalent, it is easy to virtually ignore the § 546 limitations on avoiding powers (other than the two-year statute of limitations).
TransVantage Solutions Inc., a New Jersey-based corporation founded in 1964, provided freight audit and payment services to its customers. Its core business involved three parties and actions: A shipper or common carrier issued an invoice to a customer; the customer advanced money to TransVantage; and TransVantage reviewed the freight charges for accuracy and, when everything was in order, paid the carrier or shipper with the funds that had been entrusted to it.
When a business is in financial distress, the breaking point sometimes comes with little or no warning. An event such as a termination of funding, the falling through of a crucial transaction, or the loss of a key customer can be difficult to predict, and may result in a distressed business being forced to cease operations abruptly, without providing its workers with the advance notice required under the Federal WARN Act.[1]
In In re Emoral, Inc.,[1] the Third Circuit held that personal-injury causes of action arising from the alleged wrongful conduct of the debtor corporation, asserted against a third-party non-debtor corporation on a theory of successor liability under state law, were generalized claims constituting property of the bankruptcy es
Consider the following situation: A debtor owes you $1 million, and you find out that the debtor has transferred its assets to a third party without receiving reasonably equivalent value and is now unable to pay its debt to you.
Consider the following scenario: A financially struggling consumer borrows cash from a friend and deposits the cash into his bank account. He uses this cash to make a purchase at a retail store and later pays his friend back. Subsequently, he files for bankruptcy.