A struggling real estate developer decided to do some asset-planning and transferred his partial interest in two properties to his wife as tenancy-by-the-entirety.[1] Three years later, he filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed the two properties as exempt under 11 U.S.C.
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At what point does the policy of bankruptcy, a discharge that strongly favors the honest-but-unfortunate individual debtor, yield to creditor protections from fraudulent debtor behavior? This is a question the Supreme Court recently considered in its decision in Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling.[1]
The Bernie Madoff investment scandal unleashed a slew of lawsuits, and at first glance, SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG[1] may seem like just another drop in the bucket. However, this case is notable for its expression of the Second Circuit’s rather extraordinary view of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction.
On Feb.
Editor's Note: Don is the Communications Manager for the Mediation Committee, and recipient of this year's Committee Leader of the Year for his work in 2017. We thank Don for his continued efforts and support!
Section 101(54) defines “transfer” to mean “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with[] (i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.”[1] But is a deposit or wire transfer into a debtor’s bank account a “transfer” within the meaning of § 101(54)?
Bankruptcy trustees have tested the limits of the § 546(e) safe harbor since its enactment. In case after case, the courts, with few exceptions, have expanded those limits — that is, perhaps, until now. On Monday, Nov. 6, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in the case of Merit Management Group LP v.
Section 727(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the discharge of debts that arose prior to the petition date.
The U.S. Supreme Court has, for four decades, been rocking the boat [that’s Justice Blackmun’s metaphor] on bankruptcy court authority. First, they almost killed the Code, coming within one vote of declaring the entire Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional. Then, they limit and mess with it some more.
Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides that an individual debtor’s debt is not discharged to the extent the debt was obtained by use of a statement in writing that (1) is materially false, (2) is respecting the debtor’s financial condition, (3) is one on which the creditor reasonably relied and (4) was caused by the debtor to be made or published with intent to deceive. Recently, in Privitera v.