Failure to Apply for Income Based Repayment Does Not Bar Discharge of Student Loans

By: Gabriella Formosa

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
 
In In re Krieger,[1] the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois permitted a discharge of federal student loans despite the debtor’s failure to apply for an Income Contingent Repayment Plan (“ICRP”).[2] Under an ICRP, a borrower’s annual loan payments can be reduced after applying a formula that takes into account poverty guidelines and the borrower’s adjusted gross income.[3] However, if the borrower has no discretionary income, the monthly payment due will be zero.[4] Here, the debtor, a twice divorced, fifty-two year old woman had been unemployed for over ten years despite countless attempts to secure employment.[5] She lives with her elderly mother and her sole income is a monthly government assistance check for $200.[6] She is unable to afford health or dental care, a cellular phone, or her car payments.[7] The court held that application for an ICRP would be nothing more than a formality because the debtor was currently destitute, and was likely to remain that way for rest of her life.[8] As such, application was not dispositive of a good faith attempt to repay her loans.[9]
 
Under section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, a student loan is not dischargeable unless the failure to discharge the loan will impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor or the debtor’s dependents.[10] Congress enacted the undue hardship standard to combat fraud and abuse by student borrowers, but failed to define what constitutes undue hardship.[11] Most circuits have adopted the Second Circuit’s three-prong test from Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corporation[12] to define the term.[13] The relevant prong in Krieger was the third, good faith, prong of the test.[14] While the court looked at the debtor’s “efforts to ‘obtain employment, maximize income and minimize expenses,’”[15] it focused particularly on whether the fact that the debtor had not applied for an IRCP indicated a lack of good faith efforts to repay her loans.[16] The court concluded that it did not, because the debtor was unlikely to find gainful employment in the future or otherwise lift herself out of poverty.[17] Thus, even if she had applied for some type of structured repayment plan, her monthly payments would have been zero.[18] 
 
In its reasoning, the Krieger court cited decisions from other courts, which also held that a debtor’s failure to take ICRP’s into account was not dispositive.[19] However, numerous other courts have found structured repayment plans, such as ICRP’s, mandatory regardless of the debtor’s scant income or future job prospects.[20] In fact, some courts have gone as far as stating that application for some sort of structured repayment plan is actually a factor of the good faith prong.[21] Although recent decisions in this area of law as a whole are hardly indicative of an emerging standard regarding the discharge of student loans during bankruptcy, this case may indicate an immerging trend of leniency in the Central District of Illinois.[22]
 
 


[1] Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., (In re Krieger), No. 11-80144, 2012 WL 1155687, at *1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. April 5, 2012).
[2] Id. at *6 (stating that due to debtors grim financial status enrollment would be futile and thus unnecessary).
[3] Crawley v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421, 435 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
[4] Id.
[5] In re Krieger, WL 1155687, at *1­­­–2.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
[11] Aaron N. Taylor, Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging Federal Students Loans in Bankruptcy, (Saint Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 2012-14, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087822
[12] Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
[13] State Univ. N.Y.-Student Loan Serv. Ctr. v. Menezes, 352 B.R. 8, 11, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65464 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating that nine circuits have adopted the Brunner Test in making a determination of a hardship discharge); The test laid out in Brunner states that in order for student loan debt to be dischargeable in bankruptcy three factors must be met. First, the debtor must show that she “cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans.” Second, the debtor must show “that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans.” Third, the debtor must show that she “has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.” Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
[14] In re Krieger, WL 1155687, at *5.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] In re Krieger, WL 1155687, at *5 (citing In re Crawley, 460 B.R. 421); In re Bronsdon, 435 B.R. 791 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2010)(stating that ICRP is only one of many factors to be considered)(; In re Benjumen, 408 B.R. 9 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2009)(commenting that whether a debtor should have explored other repayment options is a question of fact); In re Durrani, 311 B.R. 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004)(finding that the fact that a debtor can afford ICRP is not dispositive as to whether she can maintain a minimal standard of living) ; In re Grawey, Case No. 2001 WL 34076376 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. October 11, 2001)(finding that while consideration of an ICRP is relevant, it is “not the sine qua non of a good faith repayment effort”).
[20] In re DeRose, 316 B.R. 606, 608 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2004) (finding that an ICRP which required fifty-nine year old debtor to pay $300.00 a month for twenty-five years was not undue hardship); In re L.K. 351 B.R. 45, 52 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2006) (finding that a clinically depressed debtor, unable to hold a job and surviving solely on government assistance did not satisfy the good faith prong of the Brunner Test because she failed to apply for an ICRP); In re Naranjo, 261 B.R. 248 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that a permanently disabled debtor did not satisfy the undue hardship standard where she had cable TV, long distance phone service, and two cars).
[21] In re Wallace, 259 B.R. 170, 184 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000) (adopting the position that “good faith… require[s] a history of effort to achieve repayment, such as when a borrower diligently uses a deferment period to attempt the reorganization of her financial affairs”).
[22] Armstrong v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., (In re Armstrong), No. 10-82092, 2011 WL 6779326, at *5–7 (finding that a debtor satisfied the first prong of the Brunner test where his wife was gainfully employed and the debtor held two life insurance polices, because it would take him “too long” repay the debt”); Vargas v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., (In re Vargas), No. 08-82824, 2010 WL 148632, at *1 (finding that a healthy, fifty-two year old smoker with a cable TV subscription, no dependents and a full time job at the salvation army would face undue hardship if faced with repaying his loans).