Specific Intent is not Required to Establish a Willful Injury under Section 523(a)(6)

By: Robert Garafola

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In Jendusa-Nicolai v. Larsen, the Seventh Circuit held that section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code prevented the debtor, David Larsen, from discharging his debt from a civil judgment stemming from the attempted murder of his former wife, Teri Jendusa-Nicolai.[1] Larsen savagely beat Jendusa-Nicolai with a baseball bat, sealed her in a snow-filled trash can, and left her to die in a storage facility.[2] Jendusa-Nicolai miraculously survived, but she lost all of her toes to frostbite and suffered a miscarriage.[3]  Larsen was sentenced to life imprisonment for his crimes and lost a civil action to Jendusa-Nicolai and her family, who were awarded a judgment in excess of $3.4 million.[4] Larsen attempted to discharge the debt from the judgment by filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Larsen argued that his debt should be discharged because he did not willfully injure his ex-wife within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) since he did not specifically intend to cause his ex-wife to lose her unborn child and toes.[5]  However, the court found that the statute did not require that the debtor intend to cause specific injuries and that a broader analysis of the debtor’s intended results is proper.[6]

The Bankruptcy Code generally entitles debtors to receive a discharge of their debts, but there are numerous exceptions, including those contained in section 523.[7] Section 523(a)(6) provides that a debt arising from the “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity” is nondischargeable.[8] The application of this section has been limited by the United States Supreme Court decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, in which the Court held that debts from unintentional injuries are not covered by section 523(a)(6).[9]  However, despite not specifically intending to cause a miscarriage or the loss of her toes, the Larsen court found that Jendusa-Nicolai’s injuries were willfully and maliciously inflicted by the debtor within the meaning of section 523(a)(6), because they were the foreseeable consequences of the debtor’s intentional torts.[10] 

The Larsen court found support for its decision that specific intent is not required to justify a finding of willful and malicious injury in the decisions of six other circuit courts that have addressed the issue post-Kawaauhau.[11]  Although the circuits do not use the same definition for the phrase “willful and malicious,” the Larsen court viewed this inconsistency as a “pseudo-conflict among the circuits” because the difference in language “probably do[es]n’t generate different outcomes.”[12] The Larsen court held that under any of the existing tests, David Larsen would be precluded from discharging his judgment debt because he knowingly injured his wife without legal justification and either desired the specific outcome or should have known that “it was highly likely to result from his act.”[13] Despite the Larsen court’s finding that alternative tests represent a distinction without a difference, there is some case law that suggests that a meaningful difference may exist.[14] Nevertheless, the majority of courts have embraced a definition of “willful and malicious” injury that comports with the Larsen court’s definition.[15] Here, a broad analysis of a willful injury helped further the interests of justice for Jendusa-Nicolai and her family. Although there is no guarantee that Larsen will satisfy his judgment debt, this approach impedes attempted murderers from escaping the financial consequences of their actions.