Texas Western District

Three Years Is the ‘Default’ Duration for a Subchapter V Plan, Judge Robinson Says

The Code doesn’t contain any rules specifying when a Subchapter V plan should have a five-year duration rather than three years.

Sub V Plan Doesn’t Require Automatic Increases Based on Actual Disposable Income

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Bradley disagreed with a district court in Florida that required a ‘true up’ if actual disposable income in Sub V exceeds projected disposable income.

Lender’s Attorneys Paid Twice the Debtor’s Counsel Fees

Unnecessarily holding the lender’s feet to the fire resulted in the allowance of attorneys’ fees to the lender that were twice the debtor’s counsel fees.

Student Loans Consolidated After Filing Can’t Be Discharged, Even for Undue Hardship

Consolidating student loans after filing creates a post-petition debt that can’t be discharged without filing bankruptcy again.

State Exemption for Life Insurance Policies Continues to Be Under Attack in Texas

Defeated three times, a chapter 7 trustee is appealing to the Fifth Circuit to end the exemption for whole-life policies in Texas.

State Exemption for Life Insurance Policies Under Attack in Texas

Bankruptcy Judges Gargotta and Davis both held that the amended Texas exemption statute exempts life insurance policies and their cash surrender values.

Judge Gargotta Splits with the Fourth Circuit on Nondischargeability in Subchapter V

The Fourth Circuit had recently held that both individuals and corporations in subchapter V of chapter 11 are barred from discharging debts that are nondischargeable under Section 523(a).

A Deceased Chapter 13 Debtor Can Still Obtain a Discharge, Judge Parker Says

Death is a reason for waiving the requirement for completing a financial management course.

Filing a Timely Extension Motion Won’t Extend a Deadline Without an Order

Creditors’ lawyers shot themselves in the foot by having the bankruptcy judge moot a motion for an extension of the dischargeability deadline.

Two Bankruptcy Judges Address Splits on Two Major Preference Issues

Does Rule 9006(a) expand the 30-day window for perfection, and can perfection be “substantially contemporaneous” even if perfection occurs after 30 days?